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Security without IoT Mandatory Backdoors 
Using Distributed Encrypted Public Recording to Catch & Prosecute Suspects 
 
Our greatest enemy is our own apathy. 
Bill Mullinax 
Carl Hewitt 
Board Chair of Standard IoTTM Foundation 
https://plus.google.com/+CarlHewitt-StandardIoT/ 
 
This article explains how Citizens' civil liberties can be preserved by banning Internet of 
Things (IoT
i
) mandatory backdoors while at the same time effectively catching and 
prosecuting suspects (such as alleged “terrorists”). 
 
IoT devices are becoming pervasive in all aspects of life including personal, corporate, 
government, and social. Adopting IoT mandatory 
backdoors ultimately means that security agencies of 
each country surveil and control IoT in their own 
country and perhaps swap surveillance information 
with other countries.[7][15][39][49][51] Burr-Feinstein[3] have 
proposed that it must be possible for security agencies 
to be able to secretly access and take control of any 
individual IoT device. However adopting their 
proposal would make it very difficult to prevent 
security agencies from accessing and controlling large numbers of devices and abusing their 
surveillance and control capabilities.[14][15][39][49][51][58] Also, adopting IoT mandatory 
backdoors would be corrosive to civil liberties because any IoT device could be secretly 
accessed and controlled without any awareness by those using the device.[15][49][51][58] A 
critical security issue is that after a backdoor 
has been exercised to take control of a citizen’s 
IoT device without their awareness, the device 
thereby becomes somewhat less secure 
because of potential vulnerabilities in the new 
virtualized system used to take control of the 
device.[1][14][15][49][51][58]  
 
Distributed Encrypted Public Recording 
(DEPR) is system in which distributedii public 
and private organizations keep encrypted 
electronic records of all activity that takes place in outside the homestead including tracking 
automobiles, cell phones locations, humans (using facial recognition), and all financial 
                                                     
i including body-sensor computer networks[34], cell phones[2], bedroom TVs[31], PCs[15],  Internet LEDs, 
car, and soon brain implants[8][10][46]. 
ii for example stores, restaurants, cell towers, sports events, parks, and theaters. 
A backdoor is means by which an IoT  
device can be secretly accessed and/or 
controlled by parties that were not 
specifically enumerated concerning 
kinds of information and control that 
were not specifically described, and 
that was not specifically authorized by 
informed users of the device. 
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transactions. The records can be decrypted only by court warrant using both a key kept by 
the recording establishment and a key provided by the court. If not court ordered within a 
time set at recording, the recordings cannot read by anyone (enforced by cryptography using 
a trans-national distributed Internet time authority). In addition to ensuring that outdated 
information cannot be decrypted, the trans-national time authority can provide continual 
statistics on the amount of decrypted information as a deterrent to mass surveillance and 
control. Advanced Inconsistency Robust[23] information technology can be a very powerful 
tool for catching and prosecuting suspects using DEPR. Using DEPR is a less risky to civil 
liberties than requiring IoT mandatory backdoors for all IoT devices. The DEPR proposal 
brings out the issue that massive amounts of information are being collected and 
disseminated with almost no regulation whatsoever. Soon there stands to be even greater 
collection and dissemination, which will inevitably lead to increasingly severe scandals. 
 
This above proposal aims to balance the Constitutional requirement to protect citizens’ civil 
liberties and for law enforcement to catch and prosecute suspects (such as alleged 
“terrorists”). It would uphold the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination by prohibiting mandatory IoT backdoors that could provide access to sensitive 
personal information. At the same time, it would not prohibit access to “distributed 
encrypted public recording” (such as videos in public places, all financial transactions, and 
locations of cell phones from cell towers) so all recorded activities except those in personal 
IoT devices could be subpoenaed. 
 
Mass Surveillance and Control 
Mass surveillance by the US Government has been extraordinarily successful (in the narrow 
military sense) with the result that “Al Qaeda Has Been Decimated ” according to President 
Obama. Chinese security agencies have accessed US computer systems to collect sensitive 
information on millions of 
Americans.[29][34] Under the likes of the 
US National Recognizance 
Organization slogan “Nothing is 
beyond our reach”, US security 
agencies have likewise have conducted 
extensive surveillance including 
secretly accessing and taking control of 
information systems in China.[5][6][51] 
The extreme effectiveness of electronic 
mass surveillance has demonstrated 
how risky government surveillance 
(including secretly accessing and taking 
control of information technology) 
have become to civil liberties.  
 
Mass surveillance and control has a 
long history of being used to intimidate political opponents, unpopular minorities, and the 
populace in general. State terrorists achieve political objectives by creating a general climate 
of fear. For example, J. Edgar Hoover (FBI COINTELPRO[44]), Joe McCarthy (US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations), and Erich Mielke (Stasi)[13][22] terrified citizens 
of their countries. Cyberterrorists can exploit the immense power of IoT backdoors to create 
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mass terror on a scale that was heretofore unimaginable. Following the US Senate committee 
investigation into domestic spying by the U.S. intelligence community, Committee Chairman 
Frank Church made the following prophetic statement: 
“[The NSA’s] capability at any time could be turned around on the American 
people, and no American 
would have any privacy left, 
such [is] the capability to 
monitor everything: 
telephone conversations, 
telegrams, it doesn't 
matter.” There is, Church 
said, “tremendous potential 
for abuse” should the NSA 
“turn its awesome 
technology against 
domestic communications.”  
Mike Rogers (current Director 
of NSA) on at the Aspen 
Security Conference on July 23, 
2015 said, “That the capabilities 
of the [US] government will not 
be used against us [US citizens] 
indiscriminately is fundamental 
to our structure as a nation.” 
Datacenterism (i.e., a system in 
which all electronic information 
is accessible in datacenters) is 
becoming the standard business 
model of the Internet. (Of 
course, encrypted information is 
not accessible unless the 
corresponding decryption key is 
accessible.)  
As each cyberattack increases 
pressure to react, security 
agencies in many countries can 
obtain bulk access to more and 
more information in datacenters 
using interconnectivity with 
government surveillance 
datacenters in order to speed and 
coordinate government security 
efforts.[14][55][58] The exact nature 
of interconnectivity between corporate datacenters and government security datacenters is in 
each case a closely guarded corporate secret that can be enforced by government gag 
orders.[14][55][58] 
Unconstitutional Surveillance by US Presidents 
 
 President Roosevelt asked the FBI to put in its files the names 
of citizens sending telegrams to the White House opposing 
his “national defense” policy and supporting Col. Charles 
Lindbergh.  
 President Truman received inside information on a former 
Roosevelt aide's efforts to influence his appointments, labor 
union negotiating plans, and the publishing plans of 
journalists.  
 President Eisenhower received reports on purely political and 
social contacts with foreign officials by Bernard Baruch, 
Eleanor Roosevelt, and Supreme Court Justice William O. 
Douglas. 
  The Kennedy administration had the FBI wiretap a 
congressional staff member, three executive officials, a 
lobbyist, and a Washington law firm while US Attorney 
General Robert F. Kennedy received the fruits of an FBI 
wiretap on Martin Luther King, Jr. and an electronic listening 
device targeting a congressman, both of which yielded 
information of a political nature.  
 President Johnson asked the FBI to conduct “name checks” 
of his critics and members of the staff of his 1964 opponent, 
Senator Barry Goldwater and he also requested purely 
political intelligence on his critics in the Senate, and received 
extensive intelligence reports on political activity at the 1964 
Democratic Convention from FBI electronic surveillance. 
  President Nixon authorized a program of wiretaps which 
produced for the White House purely political or personal 
information unrelated to national security, including 
information about a Supreme Court Justice. 
 President Reagan authorized the beginnings of mass 
surveillance of US and (more broadly) foreign citizens in 
Executive Order 12333.[39] 
 The administration of President George W. Bush 
(spearheaded by Dick Cheney, David Addington and John 
Yoo) authorized even greater mass surveillance.[39] 
 Mass surveillance was continued and extended during the 
initial phases of the Obama administration.[2][5][14][15][34][48][51] 
 Future Presidents using mass surveillance and control 
enabled by IoT mandatory backdoors could do immense 
damage to civil liberties.[17][20][29][37][40][48][55][58] 
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Consequently, Datacenterism tends to progress towards CyberTotalism, a system in which 
all electronic information is accessible in 
corporate and government datacenters 
with total access by the government to its 
citizens' information.[6][55][58] Edward 
Snowden at IETF 93 characterized the 
path from CyberLocalism to 
CyberTotalism as follows: “idea of a 
simple core and smart edges -- that's 
what we planned for. That's what we 
wanted. That's what we expected, but 
what happened in secret, over a very long 
period of time was changed to a very 
dumb edge and a deadly core.” 
 
To facilitate faster and more 
comprehensive security operations, 
security agencies need to use corporate 
information mining tools in corporate 
datacenters for (perhaps with some direct 
costs reimbursed by the government[35]) 
thereby making corporate engineers and 
executives increasingly complicit in 
mass surveillance and control.[6][27][35][55] 
Furthermore, businesses can be harmed 
by their inability to change datacenter 
operations because it would disrupt[51] 
government surveillance and control. 
Government security agencies can 
enforce uniformity of datacenter 
operations across companies to increase 
the effectiveness and efficiency of their surveillance and control operations at the cost of 
inhibiting innovation and flexibility of company operations.[6][35][55]  
 
Economic Consequences of Foreign Mass Surveillance 
Security agencies have issued secret orders to US corporations allowing security agencies to 
conduct surveillance worldwide with gag orders that this surveillance not be 
disclosed.[6][14][18][35][47][49][53][55][58] The resulting mass surveillance of foreigners has caused 
US tech industry as a whole, not just the cloud computing sector, to under-perform with 
losses north of $180B and still climbing.[6][12][45][47] “In short, foreign customers are shunning 
U.S. companies.”[6] These losses could be increased tenfold if they spread to manufacturers 
that include IoT connected to their datacenters, which stands to include almost everything. 
Mass surveillance using  
foreign-domiciled datacenters 
 
Because no foreign-domiciled company can provide 
credible assurance that a foreign intelligence agency 
does not have bulk access to the company’s (foreign 
and domestic) datacenters, the Chinese government 
is insisting on the following:[7][51] 
 “Guarantee the security of user information. To 
employ effective measures to guarantee that any 
user information that is collected or processed isn't 
illegally altered, leaked, or used; to not transfer, 
store or process any sensitive user information 
collected within the China market outside China's 
borders without express permission of the user or 
approval from relevant authorities.” 
 “Accept [Chinese government] assessment and 
verification that products are secure and 
controllable and that user information is protected 
etc. to prove actual compliance with these 
commitments.” 
Also the newly passed “Anti-terrorism Law” provides 
that organizations in China will have to “offer 
technological assistance and cooperation with security 
departments to help prevent and investigate terrorist 
activities.” In practical terms, that may mean cracking 
the encryption in an app or device when requested by 
Chinese security agencies. 
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The mandatory backdoor proposal has increased mistrust by foreign governments and 
citizens alike, with the consequence that companies can be required to hire their own 
independent cyberauditors 
and/or submit to cyberaudits 
by foreign governments to 
ensure that exports do not 
have backdoors accessible by 
the US 
government.[5][6][29][54][56] 
Likewise, every government 
can require that IoT sold in 
their country do not have 
backdoors accessible to other 
governments.[5][6][33][55][56][58] 
 
On March 2, 2015, President 
Obama complained about 
government attempts to 
require backdoors in 
companies' products saying 
“As you might imagine tech 
companies are not going to be 
willing to do that... I don’t 
think there is any U.S. or European firm, any international firm, that could credibly get away 
with that wholesale turning over of data, personal data, over to a government.” 
 
Future exports of U.S. 
companies can be required to be 
certified by corporate officers 
and independently audited not 
to have backdoors available to 
the U.S. government.[5][6][55] 
 
For national security reasons, 
many nations could demand 
that the sensitive information of 
their citizens not be accessible 
in the datacenters of foreign-
domiciled 
corporations.[5][6][49][56][58] 
 
Much greater security can be 
achieved using imported 
audited IoT devices than can be 
achieved using datacenters of a foreign domiciled corporation, which might be operating 
under a gag order issued by foreign security agencies and known to just a few employees of 
the corporation with very high-level security clearances.[55][56][57][58] Growing mistrust of the 
security of sensitive citizen information stored in datacenters of foreign-domiciled 
Economic losses of Internet companies 
due to surveillance using foreign-domiciled datacenters 
 
Other countries are considering adopting policies similar to 
China, which could cause huge losses to a US domiciled 
company because it could not export or use IoT devices 
(just about everything manufactured) that communicate 
citizens' sensitive information with the company's 
datacenters.[12][13][42][42][48][58] For example, the Advocate 
General of the European Court of Justice stated: [5]  
 “The access of the United States intelligence services to the 
data transferred [to US domiciled companies] covers, in a 
comprehensive manner, all persons using electronic 
communications services, without any requirement that the 
persons concerned represent a threat to national security.” 
 “Such mass, indiscriminate surveillance is inherently 
disproportionate and constitutes an unwarranted 
interference with the rights guaranteed by articles seven and 
eight of the charter [of fundamental rights of the EU].” 
Infeasibility of auditing foreign-domiciled datacenters 
 
 A foreign-domiciled company is subject to foreign laws, gag 
orders, and other pressures to cooperate with foreign 
intelligence agencies.[7][17][18][48][51][58] 
 Infiltrators (protected from exposure by the domiciled 
government using pressure and gag orders) can facilitate 
secret bulk access to company datacenter information. It is a 
severe crime expose an undercover government agent. 
 Geographically distributed datacenters require on-site 
auditors in numerous locations 
 Replicated information means vulnerabilities could be at any 
datacenter 
 Enormous traffic in and out (including legitimate traffic with 
other datacenters that might end up with intelligence 
agencies) makes detecting mass surveillance extremely 
difficult 
 Hardware has continual upgrades and downgrades. 
 Software is constantly changing in real-time.  
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corporations is a severe 
problem for multi-
nationals.[5][6][33][47][49][51][55][58] 
For national security reasons, 
many nations could demand 
that the sensitive information of their citizens not be accessible in the datacenters of foreign-
domiciled corporations.[5][6][55] 
 
IoT in all manufactured devices 
IoT has the potential to greatly improve human health. Large-scale behavioral change can be 
facilitated by improved human interaction and awareness. Also, treatment, therapy, and 
physical movement can be guided and assisted. 
However, IoT also poses extreme challenges for medical ethics. Commercial health and 
medical IoT development has been problematic. Enormous amounts of sensitive medical 
information are being stored in datacenters of intense competitors. Much of the most 
extremely sensitive information is being sold by data brokers. Consumer health and medical 
IoT are becoming ever more intimate. Many people have pacemakers and even more have 
insulin pumps. Mixed Reality glasses are likely to become almost as common as cell phones. 
DARPA is developing an implantable neural interface able to provide unprecedented signal 
resolution and data-transfer bandwidth between the human brain and the digital world. 
Before long, many workers and soldiers may not be competitive unless they have brain 
implants.[8][10][46] 
 
 
 
Mandatory IoT Backdoor Proposal  
Suppose that a newspaper has published a story about fixing football games that has resulted  
in the indictment of a quarterback and betting ring. However, the prosecutor fears that they 
lack sufficient evidence to convict. The reporter who wrote story is then arrested on a DUI 
charge and his iPhone is seized. The prosecutor suspects that the iPhone has messages that 
could aid the prosecution. Should government have the power to ask a judge to order Apple 
to write software to give the government the ability to decrypt all information on the iPhone 
(which is technically called creating a “backdoor”)? Also should government have the power 
Power of IoT Backdoors[26][36] 
Corporations need to understand that sensitive citizen 
information is not always a corporate asset and instead 
can be a toxic corporate liability.[5][6][7][11][27][34] 
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to ask a judge to prohibit importation of Samsung phones for which Samsung cannot decrypt 
all messages that have been sent or received on the 
phone? 
 
Senators Richard Burr and Dianne Feinstein have 
proposed legislation for mandatory IoT backdoors as 
follows:[3] 
covered entitiesiii must provide unencrypted 
information and technical assistanceiv to the government pursuant to a court order.v 
 
The above proposal requires that 
it must be possible to secretly 
take control of any IoT device 
while it is connected to the 
Internet and incrementally access 
all information on the device as it 
is decrypted which can be 
accomplished as follows: 
In order to connect with the 
public Internet in a country, a 
legal IoT device must present 
an interactive certificate 
(signed by the manufacturer 
registered with the 
government) with its 
backdoor public key. All 
subsequent communications with the public Internet must be signed with an interactive 
certificate. A device must be able to be secretly taken-over and controlled over the 
Internet using the private key for its backdoor public key. Any device that connects to 
a taken-over device must likewise be able to be taken-over (to subvert use of offline 
cryptography).  
  
                                                     
iii Covered entities include all of the following: 
1. device manufacturers, software manufacturers, electronic communication services, remote 
computing services, providers of wire or electronic communication services, providers of a 
remote computing services, and entities that provide a product or method to facilitate a 
communication or the processing or storage of data. 
2. providers of remote computing service or electronic communication service to the public 
that distribute software for products, services, or applications 
iv in order to secretly access and take control of IoT devices 
v The Burr-Feinstein proposal is an attempt to legislate IoT mandatory backdoors extending current 
attempts by the government to use the All Writs Act, which has been ruled unconstitutional by a 
court (but the ruling is being appealed by the government).[43] 
5th Amendment protection against 
          Mandatory Backdoors  
Medical apps (in insulin pumps, elderly anti-fall 
prosthetics, soon brain implants, etc.) can easily do off-
line encryption with Bluetooth communication to/from 
cell phones.  Consequently Burr-Feinstein legislative 
proposal must require that once a cell phone is taken over 
using a backdoor, then the cell phone must also take over 
connected personal IoT (medical) devices to defeat off-
line encryption. 
 
Consequently, 5th Amendment protection must start with 
cell phones, which have citizens’ most sensitive thoughts 
and medical information. 
Mandatory IoT Backdoors Goal 
Efficient, undetected, complete 
decryption of all information, sent, 
received, and incrementally stored 
or viewed on IoT devices. 
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Using the above technology, it would theoretically be possible to create a system for  
protecting the keys of a backdoor system that is highly secure against outside attackers and 
even against a small number of inside conspirators by using multiple command centers with 
split keys.  
 
Mandatory backdoor technology can build on already developed CIA/GCHQ/NSA 
surveillance and control technology including QUANTUM, SMURF, TURBINE, 
TURMOIL, UNITEDRAKE, WARRIOR PRIDE, and VALIDATOR.[15][51] The equivalent 
of a (preferably unique) public key can be installed by the manufacturer on each a device. 
The private key can be split held by government authorities of the nation in which the device 
is to be operated.[57] To secure private keys, means can be used that scale up technology 
currently used to control keys in nuclear command, control, and communication systems. 
However, many nations have had numerous security problem with their nuclear weapon 
controls.[52]  
 
IoT Mandatory Backdoor Consequences  
The mandatory backdoor proposal for all IoT (including devices that electronically 
communicate with IoT) can influence countries to require that IoT products sold in a country 
must be audited against backdoors available to other countries.[6][49][55][57][58] It is technically 
much easier to audit against all backdoors that to audit against other countries being able to 
exploit an already installed backdoor. Mandatory backdoors can increase the risks of both 
preemptive cyberwar[19] and kinetic responses to cyberattacks because of potential 
vulnerabilities in the many different government backdoor implementations.[37][49][56][58] Also, 
mandatory backdoors can increase the security risks to military equipment because they 
might be exploited by enemy forces. Furthermore, IoT mandatory backdoors can enormously 
increase the power of government security agencies.[13][49][51][55][58] 
IsletsTM 
Sensitive citizen information is nonpublic information revelation of which can potentially 
harm a citizen, such as medical (including 
psychiatric), legal, financial, sexual, political, and 
religious. For example, the FBI tapped into 
conversations between Robert Oppenheimer and 
his lawyer during the hearing designed to 
humiliate him by having his security clearance 
removed in order to punish him for some of his 
political views. Also, the FBI COINTELPRO[44] 
program persecuted thousands, such as gay 
people, almost all groups protesting the Vietnam 
War, and organizations and individuals 
associated with the women's rights movement. 
Furthermore, the FBI recorded conversations 
between Martin Luther King and his female 
companions and then used the information to 
blackmail him suggesting that he commit suicide in order to avoid exposure. Likewise, 
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maintaining files on millions of East Germans, the Stasi secretly ruined the lives of tens of 
thousands.[13][22] 
Islets is a system in which a citizen's sensitive information is stored locally in their own 
equipment (without backdoors). Information (encrypted with citizen keys) in an Islet can be 
shared among devices. Islets must be robust against the failure of devices at any time. Also, 
Islet information can be backed up elsewhere automatically encrypted using the citizen's 
public keys including using commercial datacenters and distributed on other citizens' 
equipment. Furthermore, a citizen can share Islet information that they select with others 
(automatically encrypted with the public keys of other parties so that it be read only by the 
intended recipient). 
 
IsletTM Information Coordination and Interaction for Sensitive Info 
An Islet can provide additional capabilities that are not currently available for coordinating 
and interacting with citizens' IoT including commerce (home, retail, food, travel, auto, etc.), 
wellness (recreation, biometrics, nutrition, exercise, spirituality, medical, learning, etc.), 
Finance (banking, investments, taxes, etc.), IoT (food management, security, energy 
management, infotainment, transportation, communication, etc.), Social (schedule, friends, 
family, etc.), and Work (contacts, schedule, colleagues, etc.).  
An Islet can run on multiple citizen devices such as cell phones, refrigerators, insulin pumps, 
bedroom TVs, brain implants, and home routers. These devices are connected only 
intermittently and some of them may fail permanently. Consequently an Islet must deal with 
asynchronously-arriving information from various devices and from the outside Internet.. 
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The Actor  Model[24] is well-suited for implementing Islets because of its support for the 
integration of coordination and 
action across multiple IoT devices 
with strong types using 
cryptography. In this way 
cryptography can be naturally 
integrated into the programs of 
applications running on multiple 
IoT devices using programming 
languages like ActorScript[25].  
Actors use "Swiss Cheese" to 
implement coordination among 
multiple activities.  For example in 
Readers/Writer coordination is 
required so that there can be at most one 
reader in a database and if there is a writer then there must be no readers.  Actors implement 
Readers/Writer coordination using Swiss Cheese as illustrated. 
Classical logic (a foundation for relational databases) and probability theory do not provide 
a suitable foundation for IoT information coordination because a 
single (hidden) inconsistency can cause incorrect reasoning. 
Fortunately, recent advances in the development of 
inconsistency-robust information systems technology can be 
used to more safely reason about pervasively inconsistent 
information (even without knowing which pieces of information 
might be inconsistent). 
Islets offer lower communications cost because it is not 
necessary to always communicate with datacenters. It can also 
provide faster response and more robustness because local 
operations can be faster and more reliable than always interacting 
with potentially overloaded datacenters. Better protection of a 
citizen's sensitive information is possible because it is not always 
available in datacenters accessible by security agencies. 
Attempting to provide coordination and interaction services for 
a citizen by patching together datacenter services from fierce competitors is much more 
difficult than using an Islet. Further cyberlocalism can provide improved coordination 
between customers and merchants with more relevant and less intrusive advertising as well 
as better coordination between a customer and competing merchants 
Swiss Cheese in the Actor Model[24] 
             
readersQ
theResource∎read[aQuery] 
writersQ
theResource∎write[anUpdate] 
 ¬writing 
also
 numberReading := numberReading+1 
numberReading=0
also 
writing := True
numberReading := numberReading-1 
writing := False
theResource∎read[aQuery] 
theResource∎write[anUpdate] 
initially: writing=False, numberReading=0
invariant: writing ⇒  numberReading=0
read[aQuery]
write[anUpdate]
Page 11 
 
Islets might never come to fruition unless it is supported by a business model that is more 
efficient and effective than the currently popular system of Datacenterism based on the 
consumer surveillance and influence business model. Consequently, the Standard IoTTM 
international, nonprofit standards organization has proposed IsletsTM information 
coordination systems as the foundational basis for information coordination and interaction 
services for a citizen's sensitive IoT 
information. Each Islet can be hosted on a 
citizen's own equipment, such as routers, body-
sensor computer networks, refrigerators, car, 
cell phones, TVs, autos, and PC. 
Recent advances in the development of 
inconsistency-robust information systems 
technology can be used to facilitate new 
business implementations that are more 
effective, pervasive, and profitable by 
improving interactions among consumers and 
merchants because consumers would no longer 
be continually hassled by intrusive 
unwanted advertisements. Instead, an 
Islet running on a consumer's equipment 
can provide the ability to seek and help 
evaluate appropriate offers from commerce agents for their purchases. Commerce agents can 
earn commissions and fees from merchants when a citizen uses the referrals. Also, merchants 
would no longer be burdened by having to pay for grossly inefficient advertising that annoys 
potential customers. Instead, businesses can provide their information to commerce agents 
that aggregate and package it for a citizen's' Islet to be used in evaluating offers. Again, 
commerce agents can earn commissions and fees from merchants from referrals. Of course, 
all of the convenience that is currently available must also be available so that an Islet can 
access the Internet to provide scalable search, retrieval, and collaboration using commercial 
datacenters in cooperation with other citizens' equipment. 
 
  
Islet Coordinating with Agents and Merchants  
Business Model 
Islet Advantages 
 
 Coordinate information using  
o numerous fiercely competing services, for example Facebook, Google, and Signal. 
o numerous fiercely competing merchants for example Amazon, Home Depot, Walmart, etc. 
to provide improved customer experiences. 
o multiple IoT devices from different competing manufacturers, for example, LG, Nest, 
Samsung, and Whirlpool. 
 Protection against self-incrimination by holding sensitive personal information locally in Islets.  
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Security of IoT devices 
 
Greater security of citizens’ IoT devices is required because currently state-sponsored and 
other intruders can secretly access and take control of almost any citizen's personal IoT 
devices. 
 
An IoT device needs both a public key of its owner, which is installed when ownership is 
transferred as well as its own unique public/private key pair, which is created internally when 
acquired by the first owner. An owner can communicate securely with a device by encrypting 
information using the device's  public key.vi  
                                                     
vi For efficiency reasons, most communication can be performed using symmetric keys 
encrypted/signed by public keys. 
       The LWE public key algorithm resolves the important cryptographic issues including 
that known quantum attacks are infeasible has well as having the following properties: 
efficient encryption/decryption,  relatively small key size, being provably resistant to brute 
How to Increase IoT Security 
 
The cyberdefenses described below can make it dramatically more difficult to find and exploit 
vulnerabilities: 
 Use public keys for 
o citizens with publicly verifiable authentication, for example, using banks to authenticate public keys 
o  IoT device ownership verifiable using the device 
 Bio-authentication of users[20] 
 Increased hardware architecture security is needed to help cope with the complexity of software 
systems that can never be made highly secure without hardware assistance.[23][26] 
o Tiny Faraday cages can be constructed in processor packages in which encryption/decryption can be 
performed without the possibility of inadvertent emanations that can be measured and exploited 
because all external communication for a cage is via optical fiber and its power supply is filtered. In 
this way, encryption keys and encryption/decryption processes can be completely protected against 
environmental and software attacks described in Genkin, et. al.[16] Furthermore, PCs and their displays 
can be shielded (as is often done for classified information) relatively inexpensively thereby rendering 
the side-channel attacks described in Genkin, et. al. ineffective in practice. 
o RAM-processor package encryption (i.e. all traffic between a processor package and RAM is 
encrypted using a uniquely generated key when a package is powered up and which is invisible to all 
software) to protect an app (i.e. a user application, which is technically a process) from operating 
systems and hypervisors, other apps, and other equipment, for example baseband processors, disk 
controllers, and USB controllers. even compromising an entire operating system would only permit 
denial of service to its applications and would not give access to any application or its storage. 
o Every-word-tagged extensions of ARM and X86 processors are needed to protect an Actor in an app 
from other Actors by using a tag on each word of memory that controls how the memory can be used. 
Each Actor is protected from reading and/or writing by other Actors in its process. Actors can interact 
only by sending a message to the unforgeable address of another Actor. Existing software 
implementations (for example operating systems, browsers, data bases, and mail systems) will need 
to be upgraded to use tags.  
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Public keys for IoT ownership are required so that an IoT device has both a public key of its  
owner, which is installed when ownership is transferred as well as its own unique 
public/private key pair, which is created internally when acquired by the first owner. An 
owner can communicate securely with a device by encrypting information using the device's 
public key. A device takes instructions only from its owner and is allowed to communicate 
with the external world only through the information coordination system of its owner. The 
nonprofit Standard IoTTM Foundation is working to develop standards based on the Actor 
Model[24] of computation that provide for interoperation among existing and emerging 
consortia and proprietary corporate IoT standards.  
Beyond the individual processor package cyberdefense approaches and technologies 
described in this article, within the next five years, it will be possible to construct a board 
with a thousand high-performance coherent cores that can greatly diminish dependence on 
datacenters and thereby decrease centralized points of vulnerability.  
Readers the article “Physical Key Extraction Attacks on PCs”[16] might have had the wrong 
impression that prospects for cyberdefense are not good. In fact, cyberdefense can be 
dramatically strengthened through the proposed technologies outlined in this article. 
 
 
Going Forward 
The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil 
is for good men [and women] to do nothing. 
Edmund Burke 
 
The current capability of the US government to conduct mass surveillance on everyone in 
the world is coming to an end. The speed of cessation will depend in large in part on how 
fast the security measures presented in this article are deployed.[23] 
 
                                                     
force attacks, and forward security (so that previous communications cannot be read if 
private keys are later compromised),  
 
How to Strengthen Cyberdefense 
 
Since the US is the country that has the most to lose from cyberdefense vulnerabilities, the US 
DoD should immediately launch a large-scale crash program to strengthen our cyberdefenses 
using the technologies and methods described in this article.  
 
Then it will be necessary for industry and other government agencies to also incorporate 
them into their operations. 
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The presumption is that intelligence agencies have access to all information in datacenters 
of foreign-domiciled companies. 
Consequently, a nation’s security requires 
that its citizens’ sensitive information not 
be accessible in datacenters of foreign-
domiciled companies. Furthermore, every 
imported IoT device is going to have to be 
certified not to have a backdoor available 
to a foreign intelligence agency. Thus US 
industry faces the crises that its current 
IoT business model is about to become 
illegal. Already experts put loses to US 
tech industry as a whole, not just the cloud 
computing sector, north of $180B and still 
climbing.[7][12][23] Since almost all 
manufactured exports will soon include IoT, we can expect that losses to US industry will 
be enormous unless drastic changes are made.[45]  
 
Going forward, security agencies have proposed mandatory backdoors for all IoT so that they 
can always be able to surveil and control anything and everything that might be deemed 
necessary by the government.[26][49][58] As indicated by NSA Director Mike Rogers, 
mandatory backdoors mean that 
security agencies of each country 
surveil and control citizens in their 
own country[26] and can swap 
surveillance information with other 
countries. IoT Mandatory backdoors 
are fraught with peril because making 
it possible for security agencies to 
secretly access and take control of 
each individual IoT device can make 
it very difficult to prevent security 
agencies from accessing and 
controlling large numbers of devices 
thereby abusing their surveillance and 
control capabilities.[23][49][58] Of 
course, any attempt to change the device's application behavior can introduce additional 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Advertising Competitive Race to the Bottom 
 
In a competitive race down an ethical abyss, 
many Internet companies depend on ever greater 
surveillance in order to better target consumers 
for advertising.[13][27][29] However, a nation's 
security depends on limiting surveillance of their 
citizens by foreign security agencies enabled by 
Internet companies domiciled in other 
nations.[11][14][33] 
Eventual fate of 
foreign datacenters with sensitive citizen info 
 
1. Datacenter Info Localization:  Citizens’ 
datacenter information must be stored 
domestically so that law enforcement can have 
quick access without foreign hindrance 
2. Corporate Balkanization:  Corporations that 
store sensitive citizen information in their 
datacenters must be domestically incorporated to 
ensure that foreign intelligence agencies do not 
have bulk access to the information. 
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The right against self-incrimination by body-sensor computer networks[36] will be become 
increasingly important. Since personal IoT of a citizen can be an essentially part of the 
person, mandatory backdoors can 
compel testimony of the most intimate 
kind. Consequently, IoT mandatory 
backdoors could become a severe threat 
to citizens' rights. Just the public 
awareness itself that any IoT device 
could be secretly accessed and controlled 
by security agencies could be extremely 
corrosive to social 
arrangements.[5][6][15][37][49][58] Going 
forward, IoT mandatory backdoors can 
be used by a government to tightly 
control its own populace, which would 
constitute a fundamental change in social 
relationships with unknown but 
enormous consequences.[26] It was extremely abusive to use people's sensitive information 
against them as was done by the Stasi[13][22], Hoover's FBI COINTELPRO[44], etc. Because of 
improving information 
technology using IoT will 
become ever more 
important.[5][6][7][27][29][49][58] 
Adopting Islets would go a long 
way toward protecting citizens' 
sensitive information against 
both government and corporate 
abuse.[26] 
 
Mandatory secret surveillance 
by each nation's security 
agencies imposed on 
corporations domiciled in the 
nation could tremendously 
reduce the power and resources 
of multinational Internet 
companiesvii versus 
governments of nation states 
because these companies would 
not be able to operate 
internationally because no country would trust sensitive information of its citizens to be 
stored in datacenters accessible by security agencies of other countries.[7][33][35][47][49][51][55][58] 
One outcome is for multi-nationals to become separate corporations domiciled in each nation 
(for security reasons) to serve just that nation, which is already happening in China and other 
                                                     
vii for example Alibaba, Amazon, Apple, Cisco, Facebook, Google, HP, IBM, Intel, LG, 
Microsoft, Panasonic, Samsung, and Yahoo. 
IoT mandatory backdoors consequences 
 
 security agencies of each country surveil and control 
IoT in their own country and perhaps swap 
surveillance information with other countries.[15][37][58] 
 make it very difficult to prevent security services from 
accessing and controlling large numbers of devices 
and abusing their surveillance 
capabilities[13][14][15][37][48][58]  
 corrosion of civil liberties because any IoT device 
could be secretly accessed and controlled without any 
awareness of those present[13][15][20][37][48][58] 
 massive corruption as a result of sensitive IoT 
information spreading from local security agencies to 
their political supervisors[20][28][48][58]  
 lower security because after a security service has 
secretly taken control of an IoT device, the device 
thereby becomes less secure against other potential 
attackers.[1][14][26][37] 
Aligning with Interests of Internet Users 
 
The commercial interests of the Internet need to 
be more closely aligned with the interests of its 
users.  Of course, companies still need to earn 
the money. 
 
This must be done quickly to meet the challenges 
posed by the Burr-Feinstein legislative proposal 
and European requirements that foreign 
intelligence agencies not have mass access to 
datacenters with their citizens' sensitive 
information. 
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countries.[5][6][7][42] A multinational could take the proceeds of the IPO from spinning off a 
separate company in each 
country as a franchise. 
Attestation and RAM-processor 
package encryption technology 
will make corporations 
domiciled in each country more 
affordable by enabling them to 
more securely share capacity in 
datacenters located in each 
country.[23] 
 
On August 1, 2007, (then 
Senator) Barack Obama called 
for an alternative to oppressive 
mass surveillance saying “That 
means no more illegal 
wiretapping of American 
citizens. ... No more tracking of 
citizens who do no more than 
protest a misguided war.” 
 
Distributed Encrypted Public 
Recording (DEPR) inhibits mass surveillance and control by requiring a court warrant to 
access encrypted information 
recorded by distributed parties 
with a write-only log kept for all 
accesses thereby making mass 
surveillance and control more 
costly, both politically and 
economically. Inconsistency 
Robust[23] information technology 
can be a useful tool in developing 
new technology for more 
effectively catching and 
prosecuting suspects using DEPR 
that has  pervasively inconsistent 
information.[23] 
 
  
Right against self-incrimination 
 
 Citizens’ IoT devices should not require that they 
surrender control of their personal devices or 
sensitive information, to anyone except those who 
have a duty of care for them and have their informed 
consent.  
 This means that citizens’ information on these 
devices should not be taken and used against their 
interests, directly or indirectly. 
Sleepwalking into Cybertotalism[48] 
 
“If we do nothing, we sort of sleepwalk into a total 
surveillance state where we have both a super-state that 
has unlimited capacity to apply force with an unlimited 
ability to know (about the people it is targeting)–and 
that’s a very dangerous combination. 
  
That’s the dark future. The fact that they know everything 
about us and we know nothing about them – because they 
are secret, they are privileged, and they are a separate 
class… the elite class, the political class, the resource 
class – we don’t know where they live, we don’t know 
what they do, we don’t know who their friends are. They 
have the ability to know all that about us. 
 
This is the direction of the future, but I think there are 
changing possibilities in this.” 
 
Edward Snowden 
Page 17 
 
In opposition to the Burr-Feinstein legislative proposal[3] discussed above, I propose the 
following legislative principles to help guide the law in safeguarding our civil liberties: 
“The U.S. government or any of its political subdivisions, including a state or its political 
subdivisions, may not order or coerce a manufacturer, seller, developer, or provider of 
computer hardware, software, or device made available to the general public to design, 
alter, or modify the related security features in order to allow a federal or state agency to 
obtain information stored in such a device or provide the ability to decrypt information 
encrypted therein.”viii 
 
A new commission, the IoT Security Commission (ISC), is needed to enforce the 
prohibition against mandatory backdoors in citizen IoT and to regulate Distributed 
Encrypted Public Recording (DEPR) that would have jurisdiction over all providers of IoT 
equipment in the US:[23] ISC would require that every kind of IoT device be audited using 
operational bi-simulation against a publicly available operational specification overview by 
mandating corporate security reports signed by the corporate officers of a covered company, 
which must specify either that no evidence for the existence of a backdoor was found in any of 
the company’s IoT products or that evidence that was found for the existence of backdoors and 
the measures that were taken to remove backdoors from any products that were shipped and to 
prevent re-occurrence. ISC would provide registration and oversight of firms providing 
cyberaudit services (“cyberauditors”) including specific processes and procedures for 
compliance cyberaudits, inspect and police cyberaudit conduct and quality control.  
Cyberauditing companies would be prohibited from providing non-audit services (for example 
consulting) for the same clients. 
 
                                                     
viii cf. [32] 
Arguments Against 
IoT Mandatory Backdoors 
 
 Economic 
o cripple IoT market because citizens shun devices as government spyware 
o hamper IoT exports and imports because foreign devices will have backdoors potentially 
available to foreign security services 
 National defense 
o auditing citizen IoT against backdoors of foreign intelligence agencies becomes more 
difficult 
o auditing government IoT against backdoors of foreign military forces becomes more difficult 
 Loss of civil liberties due to mass surveillance and control 
 Increased corruption and breakdown of societal trust 
o Stasiland[13][22]  
o FBI COINTELPRO[44] 
o Contemporary China and Russia 
 Against medical ethics to mandate backdoors in medical IoT, for example pacemakers and soon 
brain implants 
 Security vulnerabilities become greater as the number of IoT devices controlled by others grows 
larger, for example use by local police departments 
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Available alternatives 
 
IsletsTM[26] Datacenterism[7][14][18][35][38][47][55][58] 
Business model[26] 
 
Islet-agent-merchant brokering[14] 
Business model[23][59] 
 
Ever increasing consumer surveillance 
for better targeted advertising 
Security model[14][26] 
o RAM-processor package encryption to 
protect applications from memory-bus 
devices, other applications, and also 
from hypervisors and operating systems 
o Every-word tagged architecture to 
protector Actors from other Actors in 
the same process 
o Strong biometric authentication[21] 
o Auditable public keys for citizens and 
IoT ownership 
o No mandatory backdoors in citizens’ 
Islets 
Security model[14][38][58] 
 
 
 
 
 
Security agencies have access to 
all information of companies 
domestically domiciled (with 
gag orders) including datacenters 
located in foreign countries 
Surveillance 
 
 
Distributed Encrypted Public Recording 
(DEPR)[26] 
 Ability to subpoena all activities outside 
the homestead 
 Accessible only by individualized court 
warrant 
 Totally inaccessible after a set time 
period (enforced by encryption) 
Surveillance 
 
IoT Mandatory backdoors[7][15][20][38][58] 
 Surveil thoughts including brain 
implants 
 Any IoT device can be accessed and 
controlled if connected to the Internet 
 Includes body-sensor computer 
networks 
 Each nation surveils and controls its 
own citizens 
 Potential security vulnerabilities after 
security services have taken control 
of a device 
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Conclusion 
The issue of mandatory IoT mandatory backdoors is one of the most momentous 
constitutional issues that the nation has ever faced. A broadly-based Cyber Study 
Commission (with power of subpoena) should be established to hold public hearings, 
investigate, and issue a final report in a year’s time. Membership of the study should include 
membership from law (constitutional law of mandatory backdoors), medicine (medical 
devices with mandatory backdoors), history (historical record of mass surveillance and 
control), sociology (social effects of mass surveillance and control), psychology 
(psychological effects of mass surveillance and control), and neurophysiology (mandatory 
backdoors in brain implants). 
The Commission should be chaired by a distinguished constitutional scholarix and take its 
membership from the following: 
 
Brain prosthetic researchers 
Civil liberties organizations 
Civil rights organizations 
Computer scientists 
Legal scholars 
Industry 
 Information Technology 
 Manufacturing 
Medical societies 
National academies  
Professional societies 
 
 
Testimony should be heard from a broad spectrum of society including the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive Branch  
Commerce 
Defense 
Homeland Security 
Justice 
National Intelligence Council 
NIH 
NIST 
NSF 
OSTP 
State 
Commissions 
FCC 
FDA  
FTC 
                                                     
ix such as someone of the caliber of Harvard Dean Martha Minow 
American Academy of Neurology 
American Bar Association 
American Civil Liberties Union 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee  
American Anthropological Association 
American Historical Association 
American Jewish Committee 
American Judges Association 
American Medical Association 
American Medical Informatics Association 
American Press Association  
American Psychiatric Association 
American Psychological Association 
American Sociological Association 
Association of Computing Machinery 
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys  
Center for Constitutional Rights 
Electronic Frontier Foundation 
Electronic Privacy Information Center 
Internet Association 
League of United Latin American Citizens 
New America Foundation 
Southern Poverty Law Center 
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On March 11, 2016 at SXSW, President Obama warned that another incident like the recent 
one at San Bernardino, could panic Congress into passing legislation extremely dangerous to 
civil liberties (such as the Burr-Feinstein proposal[3]). Consequently, the President should 
appoint the Cyber Study Commission described above as soon as possible so that there will 
be an opportunity for a full and complete consideration of the issues. 
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